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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Petition for Review was originally filed in the 
Utah Supreme Court under number 920305. The case was transferred 
to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-2-2(4) 
(1992). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Where title passes prior to the time a modular housing 
unit is attached to real property does it constitute a sale of 
tangible personal property? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1987), applies to this appeal. The 
proper standard of review under UAPA is "abuse of discretion" 
found in § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah 1992). Thus, the Tax 
Commission's decision should be upheld unless the Tax Commission 
has abused its discretion. See also Morton Int'l, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587 
(Utah 1991) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1987): 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property 
made within the state; . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13) (1987): 
(a) "Tangible personal property" means: 
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and 
commodities; 
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and 
substances which are dealt in or capable of being 
possessed or exchanged; 
• • • • 
(iv) all other physically existing articles or 
things, including property severed from real 
estate, 
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include: 
(i) real estate or any interest therein or 
improvements thereon; • • . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(1)(a) (1987): 
Each vendor is responsible for the collection of the 
sales or use tax imposed under this chapter. 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES: 
Utah Admin. R. R865-26S-1 (1987-1988): 
A. "Tangible personal property" means all goods, wares, 
merchandise, produce, and commodities, all tangible or 
corporeal things and substances which are dealt in or 
capable of being possessed or exchanged. It does not 
include real estate or any interest therein, . . . . 
Tangible personal property includes all other 
physically existing articles or things, including 
property severed from real estate. 
Utah Admin. R. R865-2S-1 (1987-1988): 
A. The sales and use taxes are transaction taxes 
imposed upon certain retail sales and leases of 
tangible personal property, as well as upon certain 
services. 
B. The tax is not upon the articles sold or furnished, 
but upon the transaction, and the purchaser is the 
actual taxpayer. The vendor is charged with the duty 
of collecting the tax from the purchaser and of paying 
the tax to the state. 
Utah Admin. R. R865-58S-1 (1987-1988): 
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property 
contractors and repairmen of real property is generally 
subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal property into 
real property is the consumer of the personal property 
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since he is the last one to own it as personal 
property. 
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or 
repair real property; . . . . 
3. The sale of real property is not subject to the tax 
nor is the labor performed on real property. For 
example, the sale of a completed home or building is 
not subject to the tax, but sales of materials and 
supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable 
transactions as sales to final consumers. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission 
assessed a sales tax deficiency against Valgardson for its sales 
of modular housing units to dealers from January 1987 through 
March 1990. On August 6, 1991, Valgardson filed its Petition for 
Redetermination with the Tax Commission. A formal hearing was 
held before the Tax Commission on April 21, 1992. The Tax 
Commission's decision dated June 3, 1992 denied Valgardson's 
Petition and affirmed the Auditing Division's deficiency 
assessment. Valgardson filed for review of that decision in the 
Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court assigned the case to the 
Court of Appeals on September 30, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Valgardson is a Utah Corporation and a licensed 
general contractor with its principal place of business in 
Springville, Utah. (Stipulated Facts 55 1 & 6, R. at 32-33.) 
2. Valgardson is in the business of manufacturing 
modular housing and other modular buildings. (Stipulated Facts f 
2f R. at 32. ) 
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3. Modular housing units are built on an assembly line 
at Valgardson's plant in Springville and transported by truck to 
a building site where they are placed on a foundation or a pad. 
(Stipulated Facts I 3, R. at 32.) 
4. Individual units are placed by a crane, or removed 
from the truck, and "skidded" to their permanent location. The 
units are "stitched" to other units or to the foundation or pad, 
and permanently attached to the foundation. (Stipulated Facts, 
ff 4 & 5, R. at 33.) 
5. For the transactions at issue, Valgardson sold its 
modular housing units to dealers under a dealer agreement 
prepared by Valgardson. (T. at 17-18, 29.) 
6. The dealers would then sell the ompleted home to 
their purchasers. (T. at 31.) 
7. Valgardson had no contractual relationship with the 
dealers' purchasers, i.e. the homeowners. (T. at 32.) 
8. Under the terms of the contract between Valgardson 
and its dealers, the responsibilities of the dealers include: 
building or supervising the building of the foundation (R. at 
84); acquiring the appropriate building permits, licenses, and 
local trucking permits (R. at 88); carrying comprehensive public 
liability insurance (R. at 89); warranting all work and materials 
which it performs or furnishes on Valgardson's units (R. at 92). 
9. The dealers agree to accept responsibility for the 
modular units as they are removed from Valgardson's trucks by 
crane. (R. at 85.) The dealers are also responsible for 
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"stitching" the modular units together. (T. at 16, 25 and 
Stipulated Facts 1 12, R. at 33.) 
10. "Stitching" is a process which is necessary before 
the house is completed for the dealers' customer. Stitching 
involves installing some siding, capping the roof, affixing the 
units to the foundation, and connecting the utilities, plumbing 
and electricity, and performing minor interior work, i.e. 
doorways, carpeting and some drywall work. The entire stitching 
process generally takes a few days. (T. at 16, 27, 79.) 
11. The contracts between Valgardson and the dealers 
stated that title passed on the housing units as they were 
removed from the truck and before they were attached to the 
foundation or pad. (Stipulated Facts 5 18, R. at 34.) 
12. Upon permanent attachment of the modular housing 
units to the foundation, they become part of the real property 
under Utah's Sale and Use Tax Act. (Stipulated Facts 5 22, R. at 
35.) 
13. Where the contract was amended by work order or 
invoice that stated that title passed only after the housing unit 
was attached to the foundation or pad, the auditor determined 
that it was a real property transaction. (Stipulated Facts f 18, 
R. at 34. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Sales tax is a transaction tax. The transaction on 
which the Auditing Division imposed tax was the transaction 
between Valgardson Housing Systems and its dealers. This 
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transaction is governed by a contract which states that the 
transaction is complete and title passes when the dealers remove 
the modular housing units from Valgardson's truck. At this 
instant, the property being transferred is tangible personal 
property and is subject to tax. The Commission's determination 
that this transaction was taxable is supported by the stipulated 
facts, is consistent with governing statutes, regulations and 
case law. The Commission's decision is not only reasonable, but 
correct and proper, and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER UAPA IS THE 
"ABUSE OF DISCRETION" STANDARD. THUS THE TAX 
COMMISSION'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS 
ITS ACTION IS FOUND TO BE UNREASONABLE. 
Discussing the standard of review under UAPA, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Under UAPA, this court reviews an agency decision which 
interprets statutory law using the correction of error 
standard found in section 63-46b-16(4)(d), unless the 
legislature has granted the agency discretion in 
interpreting and administering the statute. Agency 
discretion may be either expressed or implied and, if 
granted, results in review of the agency action for an 
abuse of discretion under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). 
Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 
(Utah 1992) (footnotes omitted).1 Thus, if either express or 
1
 The Supreme Court has also stated, n[i]n many cases where 
we would summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of its 
expertise, it is also appropriate to grant the agency deference 
on the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion 
contained in the governing statute." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 
(Utah 1991) . 
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implied discretion is found, the proper standard of review is § 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) which provides: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
• • • • 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; . . . . 
The standard of review appellate courts apply under § 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) is one of "reasonableness." The Utah Supreme 
Court stated, "[i]n past cases, we have held that an agency has 
abused its discretion when the agency's action, viewed in the 
context of the language and purpose of the governing statute, is 
unreasonable." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div, of the Utah 
State Tax Coram'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991) (footnote 
omitted). 
In the case at bar, the Commission has been granted 
both express and implied discretion to interpret the relevant 
statutes. Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act provides, "[t]he 
administration of this chapter is vested in and shall be 
exercised by the commission which may prescribe forms and rules 
to conform with this chapter for the making of returns and for 
the ascertainment, assessment, and collection of the taxes 
imposed under this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that by enacting § 59-12-118 
"[t]he legislature has granted the Commission discretion in 
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administration of the tax code generally." Putvin v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, No. 920329-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Sept.. 1, 
1992). 
The Tax Commission has also been granted implied 
discretion to interpret and apply the relevant statutes. First, 
the terms of the statute at issue are broad and general. In 
Morton this Court stated, "we have held that when the operative 
terms of a statute are broad and generalized, these terms 
'bespeak a legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to 
the responsible agency." Morton, 581 P.2d at 588 (citation 
omitted). The issue in this case is whether the modular units 
produced by Valgardson are sold as tangible personal property. 
The definition of "tangible personal property" in § 59-12-102(13) 
uses very broad and general terms. The pertinent part of that 
definition provides: 
"Tangible personal property" means: 
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and 
commodities; 
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and substances 
which are dealt in or capable of being possessed or 
exchanged; 
(iv) all other physically existing articles or things, 
including property severed from real estate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13) (1987). 
The legislature has used very broad and general 
language to define "tangible personal property." Thus, under the 
Supreme Court's decision in Morton, the legislature has 
implicitly granted the Tax Commission discretion in interpreting 
and applying the statute. 
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Second, the Tax Commission's determination that modular 
units are tangible personal property for sales tax purposes is a 
policy decision which should be given deference on appeal. Again 
the Morton Court has provided guidance by stating, "in the 
absence of a discernible legislative intent concerning the 
specific question in issue, a choice among permissible 
interpretations of a statute is largely a policy determination. 
The agency that has been granted authority to administer the 
statute is the appropriate body to make such a determination." 
Morton, 814 P.2d at 589.2 
Third, the Morton Court also found an implicit grant of 
agency discretion n[w]hen there is no discernible legislative 
intent concerning a specific issue the legislature has, in 
effect, left the issue unresolved. In such a case, it is 
appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated 
authority to the agency to decide the issue." Id. 
The general and broad language the legislature used in 
enacting §§ 59-12-102 and 103 is useful since it would be 
impossible to delineate every possible item to which the sales 
tax would apply. Thus, from the language of the statute itself, 
it is difficult to ascertain any legislative intent relevant to 
whether a modular unit is tangible personal property. Therefore, 
2
 Similarly in Nucor, the Supreme Court held that the proper 
standard of review was the "abuse of discretion" standard in § 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) since the interpretation of the phrase 
"purchased for resale" in § 59-12-104(28) was found to be a 
"matter of policy that the legislature left to the Commission's 
discretion." Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 187 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 17, 19 (Utah 1992) . 
-9-
applying the Morton decision to the present case indicates a 
grant of implied discretion to the Tax Commission in interpreting 
and applying the Sales and Use Tax Act since there is no specific 
mention of modular units in the statutory definition of "tangible 
personal property." 
Finally, there is an implied grant of discretion to the 
Tax Commission since it routinely is required to determine what 
constitutes tangible personal property and has adopted an 
administrative rule which defines it. 
A recent Utah Court of Appeals decision, Putvin v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, No. 920329-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Sept. 
1, 1992), involved the issue of whether the Petitioner was a 
nonresident and thus entitled to an exemption from sales tax on 
the vehicles he purchased in Utah. The Putvin court found 
several implied grants of authority which required the 
"reasonableness" standard of review to apply. The court stated, 
"this court may recognize an implied grant of discretion to 
interpret the statutory term "nonresident" if, as here, there is 
an absence of discernible legislative history and the 
determination of residency status is the "type of determination" 
the Commission routinely performs." Td. (citation omitted). 
As mentioned above, from the broad language defining 
"tangible personal property" it is difficult to glean any 
specific legislative intent as to whether a modular unit is 
tangible personal property. Further, the Tax Commission is 
constantly required to determine what is and what is not tangible 
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personal property. Thus, an implied grant of discretion from the 
legislature to the Tax Commission exists under the analysis of 
Putvin. 
The existence of an administrative rule relevant to the 
issue is also evidence of an implied grant of discretion. The 
Putvin court stated: 
The Commission routinely makes, and in fact is 
authorized by statute to adopt, rules defining who 
qualifies as a nonresident for sales tax exemption 
purposes* The Commission has clearly defined the term 
"bona fide nonresident" in detailed rules. Thus, we 
find the Commission has been given discretion to 
determine whether a purchaser qualifies as a 
nonresident for purposes of the sales tax exemption. 
We, therefore, review its decision for reasonableness. 
Id. at 4-5. 
Similarly in the present case, the Tax Commission has 
adopted Utah Admin. R. 865-26S-1 (1987-88) which defines 
"tangible personal property." Thus, there existed an implied 
grant of discretion to the Tax Commission in its interpretation 
and application of §§ 59-12-102-103 to the scenario presented by 
Valgardson's Petition for Redetermination. 
There exists both an express and implied grant of 
discretion from the legislature to the Tax Commission in its 
interpretation and application of the statutes relevant to this 
appeal. Therefore, this Court should review the Commission's 
decision under § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) and affirm so long as the 
Commission's decision is reasonable. 
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POINT II 
VALGARDSON IS SUBJECT TO SALES TAX ON THE SALE OF 
ITS MODULAR HOUSING UNITS TO DEALERS. 
Valgardson manufactures modular housing units at its 
plant in Springville, Utah, It sells these units through a 
network of dealers. The sale is made pursuant to a contract. 
The terms of the contract provide that title passes and the 
transaction is complete before the units become real property. 
(R. at 38.) 
Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act provides "[t]here is 
levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: (a) retail sales of tangible personal property 
made within the state; . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) 
(1987).3 "Tangible personal property" is defined as: 
(a) "Tangible personal property" means: 
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce and 
commodities; 
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and 
substances which are dealt in or capable of being 
possessed or exchanged; 
• . . . 
(iv) all other physically existing articles or 
things, including property severed from real 
estate. 
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include: 
(i) real estate or any interest therein or 
improvements thereon; . . . . 
3
 The vendor is responsible for the collection of the sales 
tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107 (1987) states: 
(l)(a) Each vendor is responsible for the collection of 
the sales or use tax imposed under this chapter, 
(b) The vendor is not required to maintain a separate 
account for the tax collected, but is deemed to be a 
person charged with receipt, safekeeping, and transfer 
of public moneys. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13) (1987). 
Valgardson sells its modular units to dealers who are 
responsible for linking the units together and affixing the units 
to a foundation. The dealers then sell the completed home to 
purchasers. Valgardson argues that there is no difference 
between its operations and that of a contractor who builds on-
site. (Petitioner's Brief at 11.) However, there is a big 
difference in responsibility. Valgardson's contract with its 
dealers establishes its responsibility. Under Valgardson's 
dealer agreement, many of the responsibilities an on-site 
contractor would have are placed on the dealers. For example, 
under the terms of the contract, the dealers are responsible for: 
the building or supervision of che building of the foundation (R. 
at 84); acquiring the appropriate building permits, licenses, and 
local trucking permits (R. at 88); carrying comprehensive public 
liability insurance (R. at 89); and warranting all work and 
materials which it performs or furnishes on Valgardson's units 
(R. at 92). Title passes and the dealers accept full 
responsibility for the modular units as soon as they are removed 
from Valgardson's trucks. (R. at 85.) The dealers are also 
responsible for "stitching"4 the modular units together and 
providing a completed home to the purchaser. (T. at 16.) An on-
A
 Stitching refers to installing some siding, capping the 
roof, affixing the units to the foundation, connecting the 
utilities, plumbing and electricity, and performing minor 
interior work, i.e. doorways, carpeting and some dry wall work. 
The entire stitching process generally takes a few days. (T. at 
16, 27, 79.) 
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site contractor would bear these responsibilities. However, 
Valgardson has structured its contract to avoid these significant 
responsibilities and their accompanying expenses. 
The determinative factor in this case is the fact that 
when title passes from Valgardson to its dealers the units are 
not attached to the foundation and thus are tangible personal 
property by definition. Valgardson's process at its factory 
involves fabricating and assembling tangible personal property 
into a unit that, when combined with other units (i.e. nailed an 
bolted together, the wiring and plumbing connected, trim, floor 
coverings and walls seamed and finished, exterior walls and roofs 
seamed, and the entire structure secured to the foundation), 
becomes a part of the real property. However, under the terms of 
the contract, title passes prior to the time these processes are 
completed by the dealers. (R. at 85, Stipulation of Facts 5 17, 
R. at 34.) 
The Tax Commission, in finding that Valgardson was 
liable for sales tax on the sale of its units to dealers, 
concluded that the nature of the property at the time of the sale 
is determinative as to whether a modular housing unit should be 
taxed as a sale of tangible personal property. The Tax 
Commission held: 
Those units do not become part of the real property 
unless and until they are permanently affixed. Until 
that time, the modular units remain mobile and thus do 
not have the essential characteristic of being 
permanently affixed which distinguishes improvements to 
real property from other types of tangible personal 
property. 
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. (R. at 
7-8). This reasoning is supported by an administrative rule 
which provides: 
A. The sales and use taxes are transaction taxes 
imposed upon certain retail sales and leases of 
tangible personal property, as well as upon certain 
services. 
B. The tax is not upon the articles sold or furnished, 
but upon the transaction, . . . . 
Utah Admin. R. R865-2S-1 (1987-1988). Since the sales tax is a 
tax on the transaction, it is imperative to examine the 
transaction in determining whether it is subject to sales tax. 
In the present case, the transaction subject to tax is between 
Valgardson and its dealers. When title and possession passes 
from Valgardson to its dealers what is transferred are two halves 
of a house being removed from Valgardson's truck. This is a sale 
of tangible personal property. Valgardson focuses on what 
happens after this transaction is complete. That is a separate 
transaction between the dealers and the homebuyers. The dealers, 
not Valgardson, sell the buyers a completed home. 
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with a similar 
situation in Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 
P.2d 715 (Utah 1990). Tummurru was in the "business of 
constructing modular buildings and wholesale and retail sales of 
building materials." Jd. at 716. A portion of the Tax 
Commission's assessment of sales tax was on the transaction 
between the contracting arm of Tummurru which purchased modular 
units from the inventory of the corporation. This Court found 
possession and title as the determining factors by stating: 
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Because Tummurru took possession of the items within 
the state of Utah and title passes within the state, 
it became the ultimate consumer for sales tax purposes. 
The fact that the items would be incorporated into real 
property located out of the state does not change the 
nature of Tummurru's consumer use of the items. 
Id. at 719. Similarly in the present case, when possession and 
title passes from Valgardson to its dealer, the modular units are 
tangible personal property since they are not affixed to real 
estate. The fact that the modular units are subsequently 
attached to real property does not change the nature of the 
property at the time of the transaction between Valgardson and 
its dealers. 
Other states addressing this same issue have taken a 
similar approach. In Adrian Housing Corp. v. Collins, 319 S.E.2d 
852 (Ga. 1984), the Georgia Supreme Court faced with the 
identical issue and similar facts as in the present case, 
affirmed the Commissioner's assessment of a sales tax on the full 
price of the units. The petitioner in Adrian made many of the 
same arguments which Valgardson does in this appeal. The Adrian 
court stated: 
Adrian argues strenuously that the modular homes cannot 
be tangible personal property because they are fixed to 
realty. We agree that when the modules are delivered 
and fixed to the foundation on the customer's lot they 
may become realty. The focus here, however, is at the 
time the modules are transferred from Adrian to Gillis. 
At that time, the modules are half units on Gillis' 
flatbed trailers waiting to be moved to a purchaser's 
lot by Gillis, and are properly considered tangible 
personal property. 
Id. at 855. The same result was reached in Sturtz v. Iowa Dept. 
of Rev., 373 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1985), where the court held the 
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manufacturer of modular homes liable for sales tax on the sales 
of its units to its dealer/distributer who in turn sold the units 
to the final purchaser- Other states have followed suit.5 For 
example, in a June 25, 1984 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-0688 (June 25, 
1984), the Illinois Department of Revenue facing similar facts 
presented in this appeal ruled: 
the answer to your question depends upon who permanently 
affixes the modular unit to real estate. . . . if a dealer 
sells a modular home to a lot owner as tangible personal 
property (without permanently affixing it to real estate), 
the dealer incurs Retailers' Occupation Tax liability based 
upon his gross proceeds from the sale . . . . The question 
as to who permanently affixed the modular home will depend 
upon the contract between the parties and the circumstances. 
Dealer delivery of a modular home to the site under a 
contract for sale does not constitute permanent affixing to 
real estate. This is true even where the dealer "sets" the 
modular units on the foundation but does not permanently 
affix it thereto. 
See also Illinois Department of Revenue's Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-0188 
(March 12, 1991) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-0625 (Oct. 18, 1989). 
In a letter ruling from Massachusetts' Department of 
Revenue, it was held that "the modular buildings are real 
property at the time of sale by the dealer to its customers, but 
tangible personal property when sold by the Company to the 
dealer. Therefore, the Company is responsible for collection of 
the sales tax on its sale of the modular buildings to dealers in 
Massachusetts." Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-42 (March 27, 1985). See 
also New England Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner of Rev., 1988 Mass. 
Tax Lexis 19 (August 1, 1988); In re Petition of Lake City 
5
 Copies of the letter rulings referred to are attached as 
Appendix A. 
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Manufactured Housing, Inc., 1991 N.Y. Tax Lexis 603 (November 14, 
1991); and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-210 (Sept. 15, 1987) from the 
Virginia Department of Taxation ("while the taxpayer is a 
contractor for purposes of the modular buildings . . . which it 
installs for Virginia customers, it will be considered a retailer 
with respect to buildings which it sells without installation."). 
These courts and commissions look at the nature of the 
property at the time of the transaction, when title passes, the 
contract, and the circumstances under which the manufacturers and 
dealers operated in determining whether there was a sale of 
tangible personal property subject to sales tax. These were the 
determining factors underlying the Tax Commission's decision. At 
the time title passes, the units are tangible personal property 
since they are not yet affixed to the real estate. 
Valgardson uses the same contract for both its in-state 
and out-of-state sales. (T. at 61-62.) These out-of-state sales 
were treated by Valgardson and the Auditing Division as sales of 
tangible personal property. (T. at 62.) This resulted in a tax 
advantage to Valgardson since no tax is due on interstate sales 
of tangible personal property. Utah Admin. R. R865-44S-1 (1987-
88). Valgardson now attempts to characterize the same 
transaction using the same contract as a sale of real property 
for its in-state sales. Valgardson claims that it should be 
treated as any other real property contractor, yet, what it 
really is asking for is to be treated as a manufacturer and 
retailer of tangible personal property on its out-of-state jobs 
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and a real property contractor on its in-state jobs. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated, "[w]hen a taxpayer has chosen to 
conduct business under particular arrangement, it cannot 
disregard the consequence of that arrangement when it would 
otherwise be to the taxpayer's disadvantage," Institutional 
Laundry v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). Since the contracts are the same in both 
instances and describe a sale of tangible personal property, 
Valgardson must accept the tax consequences under the arrangement 
it does business. Valgardson is not entitled to the best of both 
worlds in this case. 
Valgardson's reliance on Utah Admin. R. R865-58S-1 
(1987-88) is misplaced. A proper reading of the rule supports 
the Tax Commission's position. The pertinent language of this 
rule states: 
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property 
contractors and repairmen of real property is generally 
subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal property into 
real property is the consumer of the personal property 
since he is the last one to own it as personal 
property. 
• • • • 
3. The sale of real property is not subject to the tax 
nor is the labor performed on real property. For 
example, the sale of a completed home or building is 
not subject to the tax, but sales of materials and 
supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable 
transactions as sales to final consumers. . . . 
Utah Admin. R. R865-58S-1 (1987-88). 
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In this case, Valgardson sells tangible personal 
property to a real property contractor, its dealers. The dealers 
are the persons who convert the tangible personal property into 
real property since they are the ones responsible for permanently 
attaching the units to the foundation, connecting the utilities, 
completing the siding, applying the drywall, laying the carpet, 
capping the roof, and turning over a completed home to the 
purchaser. Since the dealers are the parties responsible for 
converting the tangible personal property into real property, the 
dealers are the ultimate consumers of all the tangible personal 
property they use; including the modular units purchased from 
Valgardson. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission is specifically empowered to 
interpret and apply the sales and use tax act. In this instance, 
it has made a determination that the transaction between 
Valgardson and its dealers are sales of tangible personal 
property, a decision which the Commission routinely makes. In 
making its decision, the Commission has relied on the fact that 
at the time the title passes from Valgardson to its dealers that 
the modular housing units have not been permanently attached to 
real property. The dealers, who are contractually responsible to 
construct the foundation, attach the modular units thereto, 
connect the utilities, and stitch the units together by adding 
siding, interior sheet rock, carpeting and roofing, are, under 
Utah law, the consumers of the tangible personal property used in 
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furnishing a real property improvement to the purchaser. (Utah 
Admin. R. R865-58S-1.) Therefore, Valgardson is responsible to 
collect tax from the dealers upon the sale of the modular housing 
units. (Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107.) The Commission's decision 
in this regard is consistent with existing statutes, rules and 
case law. When viewed in light of the record as a whole, the 
Commission's decision is reasonable and should be affirmed. 
DATED this I ^** day of October, 1992. 
CLARK L. SNELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of October, 
1992, I caused 4 copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to 
be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Andrew McCullough 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
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-21-
APPENDIX A 
PRIVATE LETTER RULING 84-0688 
State of Illinois 
Department of Revenue 
June 25, 1984 
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 31, 1984, in which you 
ated and made inquiry as follows: 
"Please advise of the requirements to assure the tax implication on the 
rchase of a modular home set up on a concrete foundation on property owned by 
B purchaser is that of use tax on the seller/contractor, not retailers 
rupation tax passed on to the purchaser, 
"Please send a duplicate copy of this opinion to: 
In Illinois, persons who sell modular homes as tangible personal property 
r use or consumption do incur Retailers' Occupation Tax liability. Persons 
D purchase modular homes as tangible personal property for use incur 
tiplementary Use Tax liability. Construction contractors (persons who 
rmanently affix tangible personal property to real estate) are deemed to be 
B users of the tangible personal property which they purchase for conversion 
to real estate. 
Thus, the answer to your question depends upon who permanently affixes the 
iular unit to real estate. If a dealer contracts with a lot owner for the 
istruction of a modular home on the owner's site, the dealer is functioning 
a construction contractor, is deemed to be the user and incurs Use Tax 
ab:lity based on his cost price of the modular home. In this situation, the 
t owner would take title to the modular home as real property and would 
sur no sales tax liability by virtue of the Illinois sales tax laws. 
On the other hand, if a dealer sells a modular home to a lot owner as 
igible personal property (without permanently affixing it to real estate), 
B dealer incurs Retailers' Occupation Tax liability based upon his gross 
Dceeds from the sale and the lot owner incurs the complementary Use Tax 
ability. 
The question as to who permanently affixed the modular home will depend upon 
B contract between the parties and the circumstances. Dealer delivery of a 
iular home to the site under a contract for sale does not constitute 
rmanent affixing to real estate. This is true even where the dealer "sets" 
B modular units on the foundation but does not permanently affix it thereto. 
DURCE: J. THOMAS JOHNSON, Director of Revenue 
By: George C. Sorensen, Staff Attorney, Legal Services Bureau, Springfield 
fice, Phone: (217) 782-7054 
Construction Contractor 
Private Letter Ruling No. 91-0188 
State of Illinois 
Department of Revenue 
Slip Opinion 
March 12, 1991 
3JECT; Construction contractors pay tax to their suppliers when they purchase 
5ms of tangible personal property which they will permanently affix to real 
iate. 
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 15, 1991. In your 
:ter you stated: 
"We are requesting that you reply in written form to verify information on 
fment of sales tax on modular homes received during a phone conversation 
:h * * * * * in the tax division of the Illinois Department of Revenue. This 
formation was said to be confirmed by her supervisor, Mr. * * * * * who 
srheard the conversation. 
We were told that because we are a manufacturer of modular homes, not 
}ile, and that at the time materials are purchased we do not pay sales tax, 
; when those materials are transferred out of our inventory, and into the 
xiuct being made, this is when the sales tax needs to be determined. These 
ces would be reported on a monthly basis using the form ST-1. 
As a manufacturer we sell our modular homes wholesale to a retailer and we 
3 responsible to pay the tax on the materials cost. When the retailer sells 
> home, it is sold as a mortgage and as a mortgage the home will have a 
ltract for deed, being taxed as real estate and therefore no sales tax is 
Llected on the retail sale. 
This is a totally different type of sale than that of a mobile home because 
)ile homes are considered private property and taxed as such the retailer 
st collect tax and report this transaction on form ST-556. 
Therefore, in summary, when we manufacture a modular home the sales tax 
the materials is reported on the ST-1. 
Please confirm this letter as the correct procedure to follow in our tax 
>orting." 
We are a bit unclear from your letter as to the manner in which the sales of 
> modular homes are structured. The manner in which the sales are made 
:ects the tax consequences. 
If you as the manufacturer, sell the modular home to someone who resells the 
lular home (reseller) and reseller affixes that home to the real estate, 
;eller in such a situation acts as a construction contractor. In such a 
;e, when you purchase the materials that will be made into the modular home, 
i will purchase the materials tax free for resale. When you sell home to 
;eller, you will charge and collect tax on your selling price of the 
le charged reseller. When reseller sells the home to the property owner and 
ixes that home to realty, the price charged by reseller is not taxed. This 
;ult occurs because reseller is acting as a construction contractor in this 
.uation. Construction contractors pay tax to their suppliers when they 
'chase items that will be permanently affixed to real estate. (See 86 111. 
ain. Code 130.1940 and 130.2075, enclosed) 
The only time that you would incur tax on the purchases of materials you 
:orporate into the modular home would be if you as the manufacturer, also act 
a construction contractor by permanently affixing the modular home to 
ilty. 
Also, if sell the home to a reseller who will resell the home as tangible 
rsonal property, that is not affixed to real estate, no tax is due when you 
LI the modular home to reseller or when you purchase materials to be 
:orporated into the home. In such a situation you would give a certificate 
resale to your supplier when you purchase the materials and the reseller 
lid give you a certificate of resale when he purchases the home from you for 
sale (See 86 111. Adm. Code 130.1410, enclosed) 
L30.1410, 130.1940, and 130.2075 
)URCE: Keith Staats, Staff Attorney, Legal Services Bureau, Phone: (217) 
>-7054 
PRIVATE LETTER RULING 89-0625 
State of Illinois 
Department of Revenue 
Slip Opinion 
October 18, 1989 
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated May 18, 1989. We regret 
ie delay in responding. Your letter was amongst a pile of letters which was 
.splaced by us and has only recently been discovered. In your letter, you 
,ve stated and made inquiry as follows: 
"Due to the conflict of information received from the Illinois Department 
Revenue we are asking for a legal ruling on the type of sales tax the 
ove captioned corporation is required to pay. 
• * * * * constructs modular homes for sale to home owners. We are 
rrently collecting and remitting state sales tax at a rate of 5%, local tax 
a rate of 1% and mass transit tax at a rate of 1/4%, and county 
pplementary tax at a rate of 1/4%." 
In Illinois, retailers of tangible personal property incur Retailers' 
cupation Tax liability based on their selling price of that tangible personal 
operty at rates applicable to their Illinois locations. This is how you have 
en treating the activities of * * * * *. 
However, in Illinois, construction contractors are not deemed to be 
tailers of tangible personal property. Construction contractors are deemed 
be the users of the building materials which they take off the market as 
ngible personal property by permanently affixing it to real estate, 
nsequently, construction contractors incur Illinois Use Tax and local 
cupation tax reimbursement liabilities based on their cost price of building 
terials purchased for permanent incorporation into real estate. In short, 
nstruction contractors pay tax based on their cost price of building 
terials and pay the tax to their suppliers at the rates in effect at their 
ppliers ' locations. 
The answer to your question concerning the appropriate tax applicable to 
sreinafter "* * * * *") depends upon who permanently affixes the modular unit 
real estate. if * * * * * contracts with a lot owner or with a construction 
rtractor for the sale of a modular unit * * * * * with simply delivering the 
iular unit to the lot site, then * * * * * incurs Retailers' Occupation Tax 
ability based on its selling price of the modular unit. This is the 
Dcedure you have been following and, in this situation, the lot owner (or 
istruction contractor) would incur the complementary Use Tax liability. 
On the other hand, if * * * * * contracts with a lot owner for the 
istruction of a modular unit on the owner's site, then * * * * * is 
ictioning as a construction contractor, is deemed to be the user and incurs a 
Les tax liability based on its cost price of the modular unit. In this 
;uationf the lot owner would take title to the modular home as real 
>perty and, consequently, would incur no sales tax liability. The 
>stion as to who permanently affixes the modular unit to real estate 
>ends upon the contract between the parties and the circumstances. Dealer 
.ivery of a modular unit to a site under a contract for sale does not 
tstitute a permanent affixing to real estate. This is true even where the 
tier "sets" the modular unit on the foundation but does not permanently affix 
thereto. 
IRCE: Archie Lawrence, Staff Attorney, Legal Services Bureau, Springfield 
ice, Phone: (217) 782-7054 
PRIVATE LETTER RULING 89-0063 
State of Illinois 
Department of Revenue 
Slip Opinion 
January 19, 1989 
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 28, 1988. In 
>ur 
>tter you state the following: 
* * * * * is
 a modular home manufacturer with its assembly plant located in 
* * * Wisconsin. We build both single and multi-family dwellings and 
.stribute them through a dealership network in your state. 
At the present time it is unclear as to the correct sales/use tax that must 
\ charged to our dealers. We wish to receive a written explanation stating 
le correct sales tax percentage, and also the percentage of the home cost 
ds tax applies to. 
Construction Contractors: 
A modular home dealer will be viewed as a construction contractor if he 
; required to physically affirm the modular home to real estate. When a 
>aler sells (with installation) a modular home so as to make it a part of the 
ial estate, he is viewed as the end-user of the modular home in the form of 
.ngible personal property. When he sells and installs the modular home, he is 
illing a real estate improvement and real estate improvements are not subject 
» sales tax in Illinois. However, as the final person to exercise the 
Ivilege of using the modular home in the form of tangible personal 
operty, he incurs a Use Tax liability based on his supplier's selling price 
the modular home. Please refer to 86 111. Adm. Code 130.101, 130.1940(c), 
0.2075(c), 150.101, 150.201(i) and 150.801, enclosed. 
Assuming that you are required to collect the 5% Illinois Use Tax, you 
ould collect that tax from the dealers to whom you sell the modular homes if 
ey will be acting as construction contractors. The dealers will not incur 
y Illinois sales tax liabilities on their receipts from their subsequent 
les of real estate improvements. 
If you sell modular homes to a dealer who will resell those modular homes 
the form of tangible personal property (i.e., no installation done by the 
aler), you are relieved of any obligation to collect the 5% Illinois Use Tax 
the dealer provides you with a valid certificate of resale. Please refer to 
111. Adm. Code 130.1410, enclosed. A certificate of resale will relieve you 
any obligation to collect tax, but the dealer will incur State and local 
ales tax liabilities when he subsequently sells the modular homes to 
nstruction contractors or other end-users. 
If you have any additional questions, please feel free to contact us. 
OURCE: Randall P. Bower, Staff Attorney, Legal Services Bureau, Springfield 
fice, Phone: (217) 782-7054 
Letter Ruling 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS - DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE 
1985 Mass. Tax LEXIS 49; LR 85-42 
March 27, 1985 
L] 
("Company") is a manufacturer of modular buildings in the province of 
>bec, 
lada. The Company has applied for registration with the Massachusetts 
>artment of Revenue as a sales and use tax vendor because it anticipates 
.ling its buildings to dealers in Massachusetts. The Company will deliver 
hilar buildings to the dealer, who will be responsible for securing the 
lules to a foundation and rendering them weathertight and habitable for sale 
customers. Transportation charges to deliver the modules will be part of 
)unt charged to the dealer. You inquire as to the sales tax consequences of 
i sale of the modules to the dealers. 
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 64H, Section 2 imposes a five percent 
es tax on all retail sales of tangible personal property unless otherwise 
impted. Sales of tangible personal property for resale and sales of realty 
not subject to the sales or use tax. The sales price upon which the tax is 
ed is usually the total amount charged by the vendor. Section 1(14)(a) of 
pter 64H states that "In determining the 'sale price', no deduction shall be 
en on account of (i) the cost of property sold; (ii) the cost of materials 
] used, labor or service cost, interest charges, losses or other expenses; 
i) the cost of transportation of the property prior to its sale at retail." 
ever, separately-stated transportation charges for transportation of 
perty 
er its sale are excluded. G.L. c. 64H, @ 1(14)(c)(v). 
Based on your description, the modular buildings are real property at the 
e of sale by the dealer to its customers, but tangible personal property 
n 
i by the Company to the dealer. Therefore, the Company is responsible for 
lection of the sales tax on its sale of the modular buildings to dealers 
Massachusetts. The sales price upon which the tax is based is the total 
ze charged less separately-stated delivery charges for transportation after 
sale, (See Letter Ruling 83-68, a copy of which is enclosed). 
Commissioner of Revenue 
NEW ENGLAND HOMES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE 
Docket Nos. 133860, 133861 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS - APPELLATE TAX BOARD 
1988 Mass. Tax LEXIS 19 
August 1, 1988 
1] 
F. Dennis Saylor, IV, Esq., for the appellant. 
Thomas W. Hammond, Esq., for the appellee. 
LL 
Ls is an appeal under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. C.6 2C s.39, as 
snded, from the refusal of the appellee to abate sales taxes assessed under 
L. C.64H s.2 for the calendar years 1978 and 1979. 
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the 
pellant under G.L. C.58A s.13, as amended, and Rule 32 of the Rules of 
ictice and Procedure of the Appellate Tax Board. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
The appellant, New England Homes, Inc., is a corporation organized under the 
*s of New Hampshire with a principal place of business in Portsmouth, New 
cipshire. It is engaged in the business of fabricating and constructing 
)dular and "panelized" houses. During 1978 and 1979 the appellant paid 
lies taxes on sales of materials it used in the construction of "panelized" 
ises in Massachusetts under "crane-erect" contracts. 
On October 16, 1980, the Commissioner of Revenue issued a Notice of 
mention to Assess additional sales taxes in the amount of $1,677.15 plus 
;erest for 1978 and $4,704,65 plus interest for 1979 on sales of 
rane-erect" "panelized" [*2] homes, based on the total amount billed under 
>se contracts. The Commissioner contended that in the "crane-erect" 
itracts the appellant was acting as a retailer of tangible personal property. 
,hough the record does not show the assessment dates, the board assumes that 
>y were made not less than thirty days after the Notices of Intention to 
ess, as provided by G.L. C.62C s.26. The appellant paid the additional 
.es and interest and on October 19, 1982, within two years of the assumed 
essment date, filed application for abatement, which the Commissioner denied 
January 17, 1984. According to the appellant's brief, the disputed taxes 
e paid on November 13, 1981; for purposes of G.L. C.62C s.37, the 
lications for abatement were filed within one year from that date. The 
ellant filed the petitions with the Appellate Tax Board on March 15, 1984, 
hin 60 days of the date of the notice of denial. 
board finds that its jurisdictional requirements were met. 
The appellant supplies prefabricated housing units to Massachusetts buyers 
er three types of contracts: 
1. Modular house contract: The appellant manufactures one or more 
ree-dimensional boxes [*3] at its plant in New Hampshire, delivers them to 
e construction site, and assembles and installs them as a complete house on a 
undation prepared by the buyer or the buyer's contractor; 
2. Shell-erect panel contract: The appellant manufactures two-dimensional 
nels for walls, partitions, and floors at its New Hampshire plant, delivers 
am to the construction site, and installs them on a foundation prepared by 
2 buyer or the buyer's contractor; 
3. Crane-erect panel contract: The appellant manufactures two-dimensional 
lels at its New Hampshire plant, delivers them to the construction side, 
Loads them, and hoists them by crane to the foundation, where the buyer or 
3 buyer's contractor installs them on a foundation with the assistance of the 
pellant's crane operator. 
In the first two types of contracts control, possession, and title of the 
Its do not pass to the buyer until after the property has been affixed to the 
nidation and become part of the real estate. In these circumstances the 
nmissioner of Revenue considers the appellant to be a contractor, liable for 
Les or use tax only on the price paid for materials used in construction, 
ler the third [*4] type of contract, however, the Commissioner contends 
it control, possession, and title of the panels is transferred before the 
tels have been affixed to the real estate. He maintains that at the time of 
msfer the panels are still tangible personal property, that the appellant is 
vendor of tangible personal property, and that the appellant is required to 
.lect and pay sales tax on the price paid by the buyer for the completed 
tels, including installation charges not separately stated. See letter to 
\ appellant from the Chief of the Appeal and Review Bureau of the Department 
Revenue, July 15, 1981 (Exhibit A). The appellant contends that it remains 
•ontractor for these transactions, and not a vendor of tangible personal 
•perty, because its crane operator retains control over each panel until the 
er's contractor has finished spiking it into the foundation or the structure 
does not release it until it has been permanently affixed to the structure 
become part of the real estate. 
The appellant presented its case through two witnesses: Robert Schrader, the 
ager of its Panel Division, and Barry Ryan, its field superintendent. The 
rd's findings [*5] are based on their testimony. 
According to the evidence a typical house is designed by the owner with the 
ellant's help. The appellant estimates the specifications and price and 
es production drawings. The owner chooses the siding, the doors and 
dows, and the configuration of the building. The appellant can furnish any 
le the customer wants; the appellant designs and engineers the house in 
ordance with the customer's selection of number of floors, number and layout 
rooms, and roof structure (framed or trussed). The appellant tries to 
ndardize the size of the walls but can supply other sizes. Unlike the 
alar houses that the appellant offers, there are no standard models for the 
nelized" houses; all of them are custom-built to the customer's 
sifications. The appellant maintains no inventory of panels and does not 
1 individual panels. If a customer cancels an order, the panels have only 
^age value to the appellant. Blueprints, made by the engineering design 
artment, are needed for the customer's approval, for communication between 
customer and the manufacturing facilities, and for construction. Roof 
3S engineering is done by the [*6] appellant. On "panelized" 
ses,engineering work is required continually and is done by the resident 
Lneer. To maintain control over its product, the appellant never sells 
sis without shipment to the site and some participation in erection of the 
use. 
The price charged to the customer for the panels is determined by the 
pellant's estimating department in a lump sum which covers construction in 
cordance with the specifications. The customer makes a deposit before 
gning the contract and is required to furnish a letter confirming the 
ailability of funds to complete the contract. This is usually done through a 
rtgage and in effect, the appellant serves as a subcontractor of the owner 
r its portion of the total construction cost. If the customer intends to pay 
cash, the appellant asks the customer to place the funds in escrow. The 
ane-erect contract is signed by Mr. Schrader as manager of the panel division 
d must be approved by the president. Insurance and the risk of loss of or 
mage to panels in transit are the responsibility of the appellant. The risk 
loss shifts to the customer when the appellant has completed the work 
guired under the contract. [*7] 
"Panelized housing" is manufactured in a plant containing a series of 
bles on which exterior walls and interior partitions are laid out, framed, 
i sheathed, millwork (doors and windows) are installed, and siding applied, 
c shipment to the site, the walls are loaded vertically on a trailer along 
th partitions, gables, and the roof system. The exterior walls normally 
asure seven by eight feet and are shipped with windows, doors, and siding in 
ace. Interior partitions separate the rooms; in panelized construction they 
not carry "mechanics" — electricity, plumbing, and heating. 
Under the "shell-erect" type of contract, not at issue in this case, the 
reliant delivers and erects the panels. When the appellant leaves the site, 
* exterior of the building is 95 percent complete, and the interior is 
nned, ready for installation of "mechanics," insulation, plaster or 
>etrock, trim, cabinets, and for painting. The building is complete and 
:ertight, ready for the subcontractors. 
Under the "crane-erect" type of contract at issue in this appeal, the 
>ellant also lays out and frames the panels in the plant, applies the 
.1-work and siding, and ships the panels [*8] to the site. The customers 
* owners or owners' building contractors who have their own crews. At the 
:e the appellant merely supplies a crane and operator and sets the panels in 
tee; it is the owner or contractor and his crew who are responsible for 
itening the panels to the rest of the structure on the foundation built by 
\ owner. 
Under a crane-erect contract, the buyer is responsible for obtaining a 
lding permit. It appears that the foundation is also the responsibility of 
' owner. Although Mr. Ryan, the appellant's field superintendent, testified 
t the appellant manufactures the floor system, the evidence does not 
close who is responsible for its installation. The appellant's crane 
rator delivers the panels, unloads them from the trailer, and sets them in 
ce with the appellant's crane. The buyer or his contractor then receives 
panels and the components of the roof system and fastens them to the rest 
the structure. When the panel is secured, the steel jaws which are nailed to 
panel and by which the panel is attached to the crane cable are removed. 
on-site crew of the buyer or his contractor is responsible for making the 
Is plumb [*9] and square with the foundation. Although the panel remains 
ached to the crane until secured, the board finds that control, and 
refore possession, is transferred to the on-site crew when the crew takes 
ponsibility for placing it in its final position and fastening it to the 
t of the structure. Once a panel has been affixed to the structure by 
ling it to the foundation or companion panels, it cannot be removed without 
troying it. The crane operator remains at the site to take care of any 
oblems such as damaged siding, twisted studs, or bowed rafters; to fill out 
perwork; and to note any engineering problems for the field engineer to 
place or repair. When the crane operator leaves the site, the appellant has 
ovided a completed exterior and framed the interior, and may or may not have 
nished the roof. If there are no finishing problems or warped timbers 
quiring replacement, the building is weather-tight but not yet ready for 
cupancy. 
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the board found that the appellant 
ansferred possession of the panels to the buyer or the buyer's contractor 
en it placed them on the foundation or other part of the structure [*10] 
be installed by the buyer or the contractor. At this time the panels were 
ill tangible personal property, and the transfer was therefore subject to the 
les tax, based on the full price charged for the panels, including 
stallation charges not separately stated. 
OPINION 
G.L. C.64H s.2 imposes an excise on "sales at retail of tangible personal 
Dperty by any vendor at the rate of five per cent of the gross receipts of 
B vendor from all such sales of such property . . . ." Under G.L. C.64H 
1(13) a "sale at retail" is defined as "a sale of tangible personal property 
r any purpose other than resale in the regular course of business." Under 
[j. C.64H s.l(12) a "sale" includes "[A]ny transfer of title or possession, or 
thf • . . of tangible personal property for a consideration, in any manner or 
any means whatsoever." 
The board found that the appellant transferred possession of the panels to 
3 buyer or the buyer's contractor before they were permamently affixed to and 
:ame part of the real estate. Until permanently affixed, such panels are not 
arts of a house" (Brief for the Appellant, p. 6) but are tangible personal 
Dperty. It is of no significance [*11] that they are custom-designed and 
3tom-made and have no use or value independently of the particular house for 
Lch they were designed and manufactured. The panels are not, as the 
reliant suggests on page 6 of its brief, "transformed into 'personal 
>perty' depending upon who affixes them to the foundation." If transfer of 
ssession or title takes place before they are affixed to the structure, they 
> sold as personal property. 
Under the sales tax statute, transfer of title is not a prerequisite to 
:ation if possession has been transferred. Under the applicable provision of 
> Uniform Commercial Code, G.L. c.106 s.2-401, however, 
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time 
I place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the 
'sical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest 
I even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or 
l C c • • • • 
i board finds that under this provision title to each panel passed from the 
reliant to the buyer when the panel was secured and it became possible for 
rs holding the panel in place to be removed. 
The board's [*12] interpretation of the sales tax statute is confirmed by 
• documents attached to the Commissioner's letter stating its determination 
assess the additional taxes, and cited in its pre-trial memorandum and its 
ef: Emergency Regulation No. 12, "Contractors and Subcontractors," 
mulgated by the State Tax Commission on July 7, 1966, and Letter Ruling 
68, " Sales Tax - Modular Homes." 
The appellant contends that paragraph 4 of Emergency Regulation 12 does not 
ply to its operation. It argues that one of its panels is not "a complete 
it of standard equipment requiring no further fabrication" and that therefore 
should not be regarded as "primarily a vendor of tangible personal 
Dperty•" 
Is argument overlooks the fact that paragraph 4 creates an exception to 
ragraph 3, which specifies the conditions under which a contractor who 
Dricates articles used "pursuant to a construction contract" will be subject 
the sales or use tax when he buys them rather than when he sells them. 
ier 
s terms of the crane-erect contract the appellant is not using the materials 
purchases "pursuant to a construction contract," but is using them to 
Dricate a component to be incorporated [*13] in the structure by the owner 
his contractor. Whether a panel is "a complete unit of standard equipment" 
not, it is tangible personal property until installed and affixed to the 
il 
:ate. 
Similarly, the appellant's reliance on Sales Tax Information Letter No. 5, 
>ued in April 1966 and stating that a contractor who builds a swimming pool 
:o the ground pays a sales tax to the building materials wholesaler, rather 
in collecting one from his customer, overlooks the distinction between a 
itractor who himself builds a swimming pool into the ground and the 
>ellant, 
> furnishes panels to be affixed by the owner or another contractor. 
A Memo dated September 1, 1967, written by the Chief of the Sales Tax Bureau 
i approved by the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, specifically 
lresses the sales tax treatment of "Prefabricated or Precut Buildings." The 
'tinent parts of this Memo state that the sale of prefabricated buildings by 
istered vendor is subject to the sales tax; that their purchase for use in 
sachusetts is subject to the use tax; that when the contract calls for 
ivery and erection, and title does not pass until the unit is erected and 
4] weather-tight, the contractor is the consumer and is subject to sales 
tax based on his cost of the materials; but that a seller who renders some 
istance to customers in installation is a vendor rather than a contractor 
t collect and pay the sales tax on the entire amount charged to the 
tomer, 
luding installation charges not separately stated. 
The board found that the appellant was a seller of prefabricated or precut 
erials assisting customers in installation and was therefore a vendor, 
her 
n a contractor, under the terms of the Department's Memo of September 1, 
7. Although the appellant's crane operator assisted in the installation of 
panels, it was the buyer or his contractor who were primarily responsible 
the installation. Contrary to what it seems to think, the appellant was 
led upon to prove that a home was weather-tight, but only that the panels 
:e part of the real estate at the time of transfer. This it has failed to 
The cited administrative interpretations of the sales tax statute date 
:e 
}licly adopted little more than a year after the enactment of the temporary 
Les tax statute by St. 1966 c.14 on March 2, 1966, [*15] and even before 
> enactment of the permanent statute by St. 1967 c.757 on November 29, 1967. 
> Commissioner's position cannot be discounted as having been adopted for the 
:st time in the present litigation. See Xtra, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
renue, 380 Mass. 277, 282 (1980); Polaroid Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
! Mass. 490 (1984); General Electric Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 402 
>s. 
I (1988). In the board's opinion, these interpretations correctly state the 
ming of the statutes as they relate to the transactions involved in this 
>eal. 
In support of its contention that its sales of panels are real property 
LStruction activities, the appellant cites Department of Revenue v. Sterling 
itom Homes, 91 Wis.2d 675, 283 N.W.2d 573 (1979). The taxpayer there, a 
:er 
custom-designed houses, manufactured prefabricated components to the buyer's 
(Cifications, furnished the builder with detailed foundation plans, and 
rdinated the builder's work in fitting the prefabricated components. The 
ses and components were unique, and the taxpayer maintained no inventory of 
ses or components. Under the Wisconsin statutes [*16] (Stats. 
77.51(4) (ii) and 77.51(18)), sales of building materials, supplies, and 
ipment to owners, contractors, subcontractors, or builders were deemed 
ail 
es; contractors and subcontractors were the consumers of tangible personal 
perty used by them in real property construction activities; and sales of 
gible personal property to them were subject to sales or use tax. 
tractors engaged primarily in real property construction activities could 
esale certificate on purchases of tangible personal property only if they 
nd reason to believe that they would sell to customers for whom they did not 
form real property construction activities with the property purchased. The 
consin court held that the taxpayer was engaged in real estate construction 
ivities in all respects, with the single exception that it conducted its 
ivities at its factory, not at the building site. Had the taxpayer 
formed 
functions at the site, the court said, the components would not have been 
ject to tax. The court held that the legislature had not hinged the 
stion 
taxability on the distinction between on-site and off-site real estate 
struction activities; [*17] the taxpayer was engaged in real estate 
struction activities within the meaning of the statute, and the court 
ased 
Introduce a distinction that the legislature had not made. The court 
ressly declined to consider whether component parts dedicated to a 
rticular 
rtion of a building were in effect fixtures, but relied on the specific 
fislative exemption for real property construction activities. Since the 
isachusetts statute provides no comparable exemption, but taxes sales of 
igible personal property, however used, the board cannot avoid addressing the 
istion whether the panels were tangible personal property or real estate at 
\ time of sale. On this issue it found for the appellee. 
The appellant also relies on Marsh v. Spradling, 537 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1976), 
sre the taxpayer designed and built wooden cabinets to order in his shop and 
embled and installed them in houses, usually new ones under construction, 
>rice that included installation. The taxpayer paid sales taxes on his 
•chases of lumber and materials. The court held that installation was an 
egral part of the contract; that in the absence of contrary agreement a 
dnet became [*18] part of the real estate, and title to it passed to the 
.er, when it was nailed to the house; and that the sale, when completed, was 
. subject to the sales tax. This sequence of events, however, is analogous 
that under the appellant's "shell-erect" contracts, which the appellee 
nowledges incur no sales tax under the Massachusetts statute. 
The appellant's request for a ruling of law on the point at issue was 
i3d. 
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:ISION 
Petitioners Lake City Manufactured Housing, Inc., and Arthur E. Budzowski 
i 
raid R. Garity, as officers, 10068 Keystone Drive, Lake City, Pennsylvania 
123 filed an exception to the determination of the Administrative Law Judge 
sued on December 13, 1990 with respect to their petition for revision of 
•terminations or for refund of sales and use taxes under Articles 28 and 29 of 
\ Tax Law for the period September 1, 1984 through May 31, 1987. Petitioners 
>eared by Joseph F. Saeli, Jr., Esq. The Division of Taxation appeared by 
liam F. Collins, Esq. (Deborah J. Dwyer, Esq., of counsel). 
Petitioners filed a brief in support. The Division of Taxation filed a 
ter in lieu of a brief. Oral argument was not requested. 
After reviewing the entire record in this matter, the Tax Appeals Tribunal 
ders the following decision. 
Issue 
Whether petitioners have shown that they sold the homes at issue as part of 
itioners' performance of a capital improvement. 
Findings of Fact 
ffe find the facts as determined by the Administrative Law Judge except for 
iing [*2] of fact "8" which has been modified. The Administrative Law 
je's findings of fact and the modified finding of fact are set forth below. 
)n June 2, 1988, following an audit, the Division of Taxation (hereinafter 
"Division") issued to petitioner Lake City Manufactured Housing, Inc. 
•Lake 
.ty") a Notice of Determination and Demand for Payment of Sales and Use Taxes 
le which assessed $ 104,629.40 in tax due, plus minimum interest, for the 
>riod September 1, 1984 through May 31, 1987. Also on June 2, 1988, the 
.vision issued to petitioners Arthur E. Budzowski 
id Gerald R. Garity, as officers of Lake City Manufactured Housing, Inc., 
)tices of determination and demands for payment of sales and use taxes due 
dch assessed identical amounts of tax and interest as the notice issued to 
ike City. 
The status of petitioners Budzowski and Garity as persons responsible to 
dlect tax on behalf of Lake City is not at issue herein. 
Petitioner Lake City Manufactured Housing, Inc. nl has been in the business 
manufacturing modular, or manufactured, homes since 1973. Petitioner's 
nufacturing facility is located in Lake City, Pennsylvania. 
nl All references to "petitioner" shall refer to the corporate petitioner 
less otherwise indicated. [*3] 
The modular homes which are the subject of this matter were all manufactured 
Lake City at its Lake City, Pennsylvania facility. The raw materials from 
ich these modular homes were built, such as lumber, plywood, roofing, 
ywall, 
ndows and siding, were all purchased from sources outside of New York. All 
ese raw materials were stored at Lake City's factory, and no materials were 
ored in New York State. Lake City paid Pennsylvania sales or use tax on its 
rchases of raw materials. 
On audit, the Division reviewed invoices which detailed petitioner's sales 
tf York customers. There were 85 such sales during the audit period. 
titioner had been remitting sales and use tax to New York based upon an 
Dunt 
aal to 60% of the invoice amount of each modular home sold in New York. 
titioner had charged and collected from each of its New York customers a tax 
sted on the invoice as "use tax" which was based on 60% of the invoice 
Dunt. 
Llowing its initial review of petitioner's invoices, the Division concluded 
it petitioner should have paid sales or use tax based upon 7 0% of the invoice 
}unt. The Division issued to petitioner a Statement of Proposed Audit 
\] Adjustment in accordance with this conclusion, which was based upon the 
vision's mistaken impression that petitioner's modular homes should be taxed 
a manner consistent with the sales and use taxation of mobile homes. 
:itioner subsequently tendered payment of the proposed adjustment. The 
rision, however, returned petitioner's check and issued the assessment at 
sue which was based upon 100% of the invoice amount of the 85 New York sales 
ie by petitioner during the audit period. 
The assessment, as set forth in the notice of determination, had two 
lponents: a use tax component of $ 52,131.14 which was based on 100% of the 
.es price of the 23 homes that the Division determined petitioner sold and 
stalled, and a sales tax component of $ 52,498.26 which was based on 100% of 
e invoice amount of the 62 homes with respect to which the Division 
termined 
at petitioner sold but did not install. 
We modify finding of fact "8" to read as follows: 
With respect to the use tax component, the Division conceded that the 
stallation of modular homes constituted a capital improvement, but took the 
sition that, in bringing the component parts of the homes into New York, 
titioner [*5] used these materials in New York and thereby triggered the 
position of use tax. Since the Division concluded that petitioner had 
roneously collected sales tax from its customers based upon 60% of the 
voice 
d remitted such tax to the Division, the Division determined that no use tax 
edit was allowed with respect to such erroneously collected sales tax. n2 
n2 The Administrative Law Judge's finding of fact "8" read as follows: 
"With respect to the use tax component, the Division conceded that the 
stallation of the modular homes constituted a capital improvement, but took 
5 position that, in bringing the component parts of the homes into New York, 
titioner used these materials in New York and thereby triggered the 
position 
the use tax. Since petitioner had collected tax from its customers based 
Dn 60% of the invoice and remitted such tax to the Division, no credit was 
Lowed with respect to such erroneously collected tax." 
This fact was modified to clarify that the finding of fact was intended to 
ite what the Division did on audit with respect to the use tax component and 
5 rationale for this action. 
With respect to the sales tax component of the [*6] assessment, the 
vision concluded that 62 of petitioner's New York sales consisted of sales of 
lular home sections or components without installation. The Division took 
.ition that such sales were retail sales of tangible personal property 
>ject 
sales tax. Petitioner's receipts in respect of the 6 2 such sales during the 
it period totaled $ 1,915,273.00. The Division determined that sales tax 
these sales totaled $ 130,753.00. The Division allowed petitioner credit 
8,254.74 in tax which petitioner had collected and remitted in respect of 
se sales (based upon 60% of the invoice price), and determined petitioner to 
liable for the difference of $ 52,498.26. 
The Division's conclusion as to whether a particular modular home was sold 
installed or uninstalled basis was based solely upon information contained 
e invoice. Where an invoice included a charge designated "roll-on", the 
vision determined that the home in question was installed by petitioner. 
ere an invoice did not set forth such a "roll-on" charge, the Division 
ncluded that the home in question was sold uninstalled. 
At the commencement of the hearing in the instant matter, [*7] the 
vision conceded that the use tax component of its assessment was improper, 
gaining at issue, therefore, is an assessment of $ 52,498.26, plus interest, 
ich results from the sales tax component of the assessment. 
Also at the hearing, petitioner conceded its liability with respect to one 
Le determined by the Division to be subject to sales tax. Specifically, 
titioner conceded it owed sales tax on its sale of a modular home, sold 
Installed, to Cairo Homes pursuant to an invoice dated January 24, 1986. 
:itioner collected and remitted $ 1,504.56 in tax on this sale, and conceded 
owed an additional $ 1,065.98 with respect to this sale. 
Petitioner sells most of its homes in Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York. Most 
the sales remaining at issue were made through a real estate agent, or 
rough a dealer whose function is similar to that of a real estate agent. In 
>ry one of these cases, the customer had identified a specific piece of land 
which the home was to be installed before an order was placed with Lake 
;y. The dealer or realtor accompanied the customer to the site to 
:ertain 
ither a modular home could be installed at the site. The dealer or realtor 
] then prepared a diagram of the customer's proposed floor plan for the 
ular home. Modifications were sometimes necessary to the customer's 
ginal 
ign before a feasible final design could be prepared. Lake City then 
pared a blueprint which was forwarded to the customer for final approval. 
Petitioner's modular homes were custom built, and the company did not 
ntain any inventory of standard home designs. Its customers chose such 
ngs as linoleum patterns, wallpaper patterns, roofing and siding from a 
lection of samples petitioner provided to its dealers. 
Petitioner sent each of its customers a certificate of capital improvement 
m to be signed by the customer before production began. On each of these 
ms, Lake City was identified on the certificate as the contractor, 
itioner obtained a certificate of capital improvement for each of the sales 
oh are the subject of this proceeding. Petitioner was unable to produce 
these certificates at the hearing. 
Modular homes typically consist of two or four sections. These sections are 
lfactured at Lake City's factory and are shipped by truck to the 
:allation 
>. Petitioner made all arrangements [*9] for the shipping of the houses. 
l the sections arrived at the site, they were unloaded from the truck either 
electric jacks or a crane, and were assembled and permanently installed on a 
undation. The "roll-on" crew which performed the installation work for each 
the homes in questions was W. D. Construction. In every instance, 
titioner 
ntacted the "roll-on" crew to arrange for the installation and to advise the 
staller when the sections of the house would be on-site and ready for 
stallation. Since the same installer was used in each of the sales at issue, 
is installer was aware of the particular manner in which petitioner's homes 
ould be installed. 
As noted previously, certain of petitioner's invoices listed a "roll-on" 
arge representing the cost of installation work and certain of these invoices 
i not list such a charge. A "roll-on" charge was listed on the customer 
voice in instances where the installer had inspected the site and advised 
titioner what the "roll-on" charge would be. The "roll-on" charge was not 
sted on the customer invoice in those instances where either the installer 
i 
t inspected the site or where the conditions at the [*10] site indicated 
at additional work might be necessary for proper installation. Under such 
rcumstances, since petitioner shipped the invoice along with the house, the 
Dll-on" charge could not be listed on the invoice. Where the "roll-on" 
arge 
3 not listed on petitioner's invoice, the installer billed the dealer. The 
aler, in turn, would either pay the installer (and thereby absorb the 
Dll-on" charge) or pass the charge along to the customer. 
The installation of a modular manufactured home on its foundation is 
rmanent; a home cannot be moved once it has been installed. 
Petitioner maintained insurance on each home until it was permanently 
stalled on its foundation. At that point, the home was covered by the 
stomer's homeowners insurance. Also at that point, title to the home passed 
>m petitioner to the customer. At no point did the dealer maintain any 
>urance on the home. Also, in the event a customer cancelled an order after 
>duction commenced, petitioner did not have any claim against the dealer. 
For purposes of granting mortgage loans, banks treated petitioner's modular 
les the same as other homes. Banks established draw schedules, and any final 
.1] release of funds would not be made until the home had been permanently 
•tailed on its foundation and inspected by the bank. 
Petitioner provided a one-year warranty on each home. Petitioner, and not 
\ dealer, was responsible for performing any work under the warranty. 
Opinion 
The Administrative Law Judge held that retail sales of tangible personal 
»perty are generally subject to sales tax, although such property may be 
mpt from sales tax if it was sold by a contractor to a person for whom the 
tractor is performing a capital improvement to real property, and the 
gible personal property was an integral part of that capital improvement, 
ther, the Administrative Law Judge determined that petitioner had failed to 
monstrate that all the modular homes it sold in New York State were capital 
iprovements performed by petitioner, deeming sixty-two of petitioner's sales 
odular homes to be retail sales of tangible personal property and, as such, 
bject to sales tax. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge denied the 
tition of petitioner and sustained the notices of determination and demands 
r payment• 
On exception, petitioner makes several assertions. First, [*12] it 
gues that the Administrative Law Judge exceeded his authority by addressing 
e issue of whether petitioner is entitled to a credit or refund for 
roneously collected use tax. Second, it asserts that the Administrative Law 
dge improperly ignored 20 NYCRR 544.3(b). n3 Finally, it contends that 
titioner successfully demonstrated at the hearing that it was responsible for 
1 installations of the homes and, therefore, had performed capital 
provements in every instance at issue. 
n3 The Administrative Law Judge framed the issue as whether petitioner 
ltracted to install the homes. Petitioner asserts that the fundamental 
sstion presented, pursuant to the regulation, is whether the manufacturer 
Ld 
5 home directly to the customer, rather than to a contractor, subcontractor, 
repairman who then installed it. 
In opposition, the Division makes several assertions. First, it contends 
it the question of whether the Administrative Law Judge had exceeded his 
;hority regarding the use tax is moot because the Division conceded that 
,nt 
hearing. Second, it asserts that 20 NYCRR 544.3(b) was properly ignored 
:ause it does not address the situation at hand. Finally, [*13] it 
fues 
it the Administrative Law Judge properly framed the issue as whether 
:itioner contracted to install the homes. 
We affirm the determination of the Administrative Law Judge. 
Every retail sale of tangible personal property is subject to sales tax 
ess otherwise exempted or excluded from tax (Tax Law @ 1105[a]). Tangible 
sonal property sold by a contractor to a person for whom it is making a 
dtal improvement to real property, where the tangible personal property is 
ome an integral part of the improvement, is exempt from sales tax (Tax Law @ 
5[a][17]). A capital improvement is defined at Tax Law @ 1101(b)(9)(i) as: 
11
 (i) An addition or alteration to real property which: 
"(A) Substantially adds to the value of the real property, or appreciably 
longs the useful life of the real property; and 
"(B) Becomes part of the real property or is permanently affixed to the real 
perty so that removal would cause material damage to the property or article 
self; and 
•'(C) Is intended to become a permanent installation.11 
The fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner, as a contractor, 
rformed a capital improvement on the real property of its customers [*14] 
th respect to the sixty-two sales at issue. Failure to show that a capital 
provement was made by petitioner results in the imposition of sales tax. To 
termine if a capital improvement was made, we must look at the transaction as 
occurred. 
The retail sale of a modular home from one party to another is the sale of 
igible personal property, and is therefore subject to sales tax under Tax 
* @ 1105(a). To qualify for an exemption from sales tax based upon the 
rformance of a capital improvement in conjunction with the sale of the 
igible personal property, the applicability of the exemption must be 
Eirmatively shown (Tax Law @ 1132[c]). The contractor must demonstrate that 
sold the home to the customer and that it installed the home as part of the 
Le (Tax Law @ 1115[a][17]) . Just because a capital improvement is ultimately 
ie to property, it does not necessarily follow that an exemption from sales 
c is available. The burden is on the contractor to demonstrate that it made 
5 capital improvement in conjunction with the sale. If this showing is not 
ie, the sale of the home is a sale of tangible personal property which is 
}ject to sales tax. 
Based [*15] upon this analysis, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
L the sales of modular homes were in conjunction with the making of capital 
movements by petitioner on the real property of its customers. At issue are 
:ty-two modular homes sold by petitioner. For these sales to qualify for 
»mption from sales tax, petitioner must affirmatively demonstrate that it 
; the contractor who installed the homes. Petitioner has not done this. The 
.es of the homes to customers are well documented. However, proof regarding 
s installation of these homes is lacking. 
In its audit, the Division relied on sales invoices to determine whether a 
lular home was sold on an installed or uninstalled basis, as shown by the 
isence or absence, respectively, of a roll-on charge. The sales invoices for 
s sixty-two homes at issue did not include a roll-on charge. This led the 
.itor and the Administrative Law Judge to conclude that the sales of those 
ty-two modular homes did not qualify for an exemption from sales tax 
er Tax Law @ 1115(a)(17). We agree. 
Petitioner has offered no documentation to show the existence of a 
tractor-subcontractor relationship with W. D. Construction, [*16] the 
taller. Although Lake City's president, Mr. Budzowski, testified that Lake 
ty was subcontracting to W. D. Construction, the Administrative Law Judge 
>und this oral testimony of petitioner's president to be insufficient in the 
•sence of supporting documentation. We agree with this finding. 
Further, the assertion of a contractor-subcontractor relationship is 
ntradicted by the fact that, with respect to the sales at issue, petitioner 
s not billed for the installation and did not pay for it. 
Petitioner has produced all but five of the certificates of capital 
provement for the sales at issue. However, certificates of capital 
provement are irrelevant to the threshold issue, i.e., whether petitioner was 
e contractor that made the installation. If this showing is made, the 
rtificates would then become relevant. But, since petitioner has not shown 
at it was the contractor-installer, the capital improvement certificates are 
mply not applicable. n4 
n4 The capital improvement certificate, in accordance with Tax Law @ 
15(a)(17), makes it quite clear on its face that it only applies to a 
ntractor making capital improvements to real property. At the top of the 
rm 
states "[t]o be completed by customer and given to, signed by and retained 
itractor making capital improvement to the real property." Further, in bold 
Lnt the form states that "THIS CERTIFICATE MAY NOT BE USED TO PURCHASE 
[LDING MATERIALS OR OTHER TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX FREE" (see, Exhibit 
The capital improvement form was modified in April, 1982, to make it clear 
it it could not be accepted by a vendor who was not a contractor with respect 
that sale (see, Matter of Neal Andrews, Ltd., Tax Appeals Tribunal, October 
1988). [*17] 
For this reason, petitioner's reliance on Matter of Saf-Tee Plumbing Corp. 
ly (77 AD2d 1, 432 NYS2d 409) is misplaced. Saf-Tee Plumbing addressed the 
ue of whether work done by a contractor for a customer constitutes a repair 
a capital improvement in regard to the good faith receipt of a certificate 
ital improvement by the contractor. The issue in the present case is 
ther 
seller of a product which might qualify as a capital improvement has 
onstrated that it installed the product and was the contractor, thereby 
ggering the capital improvement exemption. 
Further, petitioner's reliance on Matter of Morton Bldgs. v. Chu (126 AD2d 
, 510 NYS2d 320, affd 70 NY2d 725, 519 NYS2d 643) is incorrect. Morton 
gs. addressed the issue of applying a use tax to the manufacture, sale, and 
ction of pre-engineered buildings in New York State using building 
ponents 
ufactured outside the State. The weight given to the certificates of 
ital 
rovement was not an issue in Morton Bldgs., as they were accepted without 
russion in the undisputed facts of the case. In contrast, the weight given 
the certificates of capital improvement [*18] in the present case is an 
sue. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the 
rtificates of capital construction are inconclusive. Morton Bldgs. is, 
erefore, inapplicable to the case at hand. 
This is not, as petitioner alleges, a matter of form over substance. Absent 
ditional evidence conclusively showing that petitioner made capital 
provements in conjunction with each sale of a modular home, we cannot draw 
nclusions which petitioner advances. The sales of the sixty-two modular 
Ties are, therefore, subject to sales tax pursuant to Tax Law @ 1105(a). 
Petitioner has made several assertions on exception. First, petitioner 
Lntains that the Administrative Law Judge exceeded his authority by 
dressing the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to a credit or refund 
r 
roneously collected use tax. This is in regard to the modified fact set 
rth 
Dve. We believe the fact, as modified, is responsive to petitioner's 
jection. 
Second, petitioner states that, as a general matter, the Division of Tax 
}eals is bound by the regulations set forth by the Department of Taxation and 
aance and that, based upon this principle, the Administrative [*19] Law 
ige improperly ignored 20 NYCRR 544.3(b). Regarding the authority of the 
rision of Tax Appeals, it is an independent entity which is specifically 
;horized to rule on the validity of the regulations promulgated by the 
rision (see, Tax Law @@ 2002, 2006[7]). Given this fact, petitioner's 
Liance on Matter of Duflo Spray-Chemical v. Jorling (153 AD2d 244, 550 NYS2d 
1), Matter of Sinclair v. Smith (97 AD2d 953, 468 NYS2d 749), and Matter of 
imbers v. Coughlin (76 AD2d 980, 429 NYS2d 74) is misplaced. 
The regulation in question, 20 NYCRR 544.3(b), states: 
''(b) Sales of factory manufactured homes. (1) The sale of a factory 
tufactured home which has not been installed on real property as a capital 
>rovement is subject to the sales and compensating use taxes as the sale of 
Lgible personal property. Upon a retail sale, tax is computed on the total 
.es price. The '70 percent rule' described in subparagraph (a)(2)(i) of this 
ition does not apply to the sale or use of a factory manufactured home. 
"(2) The sale of a factory manufactured home to a contractor, subcontractor 
repairman to be installed as a capital improvement by such contractor, 
0J subcontractor or repairman is subject to sales and compensating use tax 
a retail sale of tangible personal property." 
Petitioner interprets the regulation to mean that if a factory manufactured 
e is sold directly to the customer (not a middleman) and is installed on 
1 
perty, it is not a sale of tangible personal property and is, therefore, not 
tbject to sales tax (Petitioner's brief on exception, p. 7). In opposition, 
le Division states that the regulation is not on point because it does not 
Idress the factual issue here — whether petitioner sold and installed the 
>mes by its employees or a subcontractor. The Division asserts that this is a 
:enario not addressed in the regulation, since 20 NYCRR 544.3(b)(1) addresses 
[installed sales and 20 NYCRR 544.3(b)(2) addresses sales to contractors and 
.bcontractors (Division's reply letter, pp. 2-3). Both interpretations are 
correct. 
The critical portion of the regulation for purposes of this issue is the 
rst line of 20 NYCRR 544.3(b)(1) which states, in sum, that regardless of who 
e buyer is, a sale of an uninstalled factory manufactured home is subject to 
les tax. Conversely, the sale of an installed [*21] factory manufactured 
me, i.e., sale of an uninstalled home where installation is a component of 
e 
les transaction, is not subject to sales tax. 
It is possible for a buyer to purchase a factory manufactured home from the 
nufacturer but to make arrangements to have it installed by another party, 
titioner has failed to establish that the sales at issue were not completed 
Is manner. In this scenario, the sale of the home would be subject to sales 
* because the home was purchased on an uninstalled basis. Though the home 
LI ultimately be installed on the real property of the buyer, thereby 
istituting a capital improvement, the steps taken to reach this point do not 
Lgger the exemption from sales tax because installation was secured 
lependent of the sale of the home. This is a subtlety that petitioner needs 
appreciate, as this subtlety is the basis of the Administrative Law Judge's 
termination and our affirmation on exception. 
Thus, the Administrative Law Judge did not err by not addressing regulation 
NYCRR 544.3(b)(1) in his determination because this regulation does not 
.er 
i result here. Under the regulation, petitioner sold the homes on an 
2] uninstalled basis and is subject to tax on these sales. 
To summarize, the timing and nature of the transactions which result in a 
tory manufactured home being installed on the real property of a customer, 
tates whether an exemption from sales tax is available. The making of a 
ital improvement does not automatically allow for an exemption. Rather, the 
ing of a capital improvement must be in conjunction with the sale of the 
gible personal property which is integrated in the improvement. Any 
crepancy in the timing or control of the transaction may result in the 
vrailability of the exemption. As stated previously, petitioner has failed 
Dnstrate that it was responsible for the installation of the modular homes 
Issue. Absent this proof, petitioner does not qualify for an exemption from 
Les tax on the transactions. 
A c o r d i n q l y , it • ' l,,r *•'? * *•• J U U S L I > , ai*H ULi KEI
 k . .^+-
1. The exception at Lake City Manufactured Housinc. ::. ., and Arthur E. 
dzowski and Gerald '" ^aritv. as officers,, is denied; 
2. The determination ,:.f : : ,- Administrative Law ;\idc- ^ affirmed; 
3. The petition ui ijaxe .': Manufactured Housing, Inc., and Artl mr E 
dzowski and Gerald [*23] r. Garity, as officers, is denied; and 
4. The notices of determination and demand for payment of sales and use 
xes due, as adjusted in the Administrative Law Judge's determination, are 
stained. 
Re: Ruling Request/Sales and Use Tax 
0 
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION 
fj
-.w va. idx I .EXIS 7 8 
September 1 5 198 7 
1] 
FORST 
This will reply to your letter of July 23, 1987 seeking information on the 
rrect application of the sales and use tax to the sale and installation by * 
* (taxpayer), of one-unit modular buildings made o: .ncrete and <?tee„ : , 
xginia customers 
FACTS 
Accordi ng to the information enclosed with your letter, the taxpayer is 
tgaged in the manufacture of the above mentioned modular buildings in its 
.orida factory for use as branch banks, fast food restaurants, professional 
ifices, gas marts, health clinics, etc. In general, the taxpayer ships the 
Lildings to its Virginia customers with fully tested plumbing, heating, and 
.r 
mentioning systems in place. Some buildings are also shipped with floor 
.les, furnishings, bathroom fixtures, and pictures for walls already in place; 
rcording to customer specifications. After shipment of the bui ldings to its 
.rginia customers, the taxpayer provides installation work at the job site 
Accordingly, the taxpayer seeks a ruling on the correct
 appXicatioiI of the 
ix to the sale and installation of the modular buildings for Virginia 
is tomers. 
RULING 
@ of the Virginia Code provides that "[a]ny person who contracts 
k2] . zo perform construction, reconstruction, installation, repair, or 
ay other service with respect to real estate or fixtures thereon, and in 
Dnnection therewith to furnish tangible personal property, shall be deemed i o 
ive purchased such tangible personal property for use or consumption." In 
idition, the statute provides that M[a]ny sale t D such person 
lall 
* deem* * . . . to the ultimate consumer and nc *• f - resale." 
1US, 
contractor respecting real estate is deemed to be the taxa: 
Dnsumer 
f all materials furnished under a contract to erect or install property that 
ill become affixed to realty and does not col] ect the sales tax from his 
.stomers d len performing such contracts. 
Since the modular buildings sold and installed by the taxpayer become a 
.rt of realty and are assessed as real property (rather than tangible personal 
'operty) for Virginia local tax purposes , 1 conclude that the taxp >a} ei: ac I s as 
contractor respecting real estate when I t sells and i nstalls such buildings, 
>gether with any fixtures permanent! y affixed thereto, for Virgi ni a customers. 
:cordingly, the taxpayer will be subject to the tax 01 1 any materials, [*3] 
[uipment, etc., used to construct buildings for Virginia customers, subject to 
nonrefundable credit for any tax paid on such materials, equipment, etc., in 
le state in which they were purchased. In addition, the taxpayer will not 
>ed to collect the sales tax from its Virginia customers. For example, if the 
ixpayer pays Florida sales tax on its purchases of materials used in the 
Lbrication of the modular buildings, the taxpayer may claim a credit against 
.rginia's use tax to the extent of such Florida sales tax prevl ously paid, i n 
1 amount not to exceed the amount of the Virginia tax. 
However, while the taxpayer is a contractor for purposes of the modular 
lildings, (and fixtures attached thereto), which it installs for Virginia 
istomers, it will be considered a retailer with respect to buildings which "\ 
>lls without installation. Accordingly, the taxpayer would be required to 
)llect the tar ^ "hKo total sales price of any modular bui 1 ding which it sells 
) a Virginia customer for its own i nstallation or to a Virginia contractor for 
istallation for a customer. In addition, the taxpayer will be considered a 
rtailer with respect to any other items of tangible personal [*4] property 
lich it provides to its Virginia customers in connection with its installation 
I the modular buildings, but which do not become permanently affixed to the 
lildings, such as wall pictures, furniture, and similar items. 
For your further information, I have enclosed copies of two rulings issued 
{ the department, dated April 3, 1985 and April 21, 1987, in closely related 
ases, together with applicable sales and use tax regulation sections. I hope 
lat all of the foregoing has responded to your questions, but let me know if 
DU have any further questions, 
W H. Forst, Tax Commissioner 
